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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
WEST UNION CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND IR~ 
RIGATION COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, et al, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 7190 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
(Numbers in parentheses, preceded by "JR", refer to 
pages in Judgment Roll file; plain numbers in parentheses 
refer to pages in Transcript.) 
STATEMENT 
The statements of facts given by appellant are not con-
sidered by respondent to accurately present the evidence 
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upon which the trial court acted and the questions posed 
do not present the questions which this. Court must decide 
in this case. 
The evidence showed that the Provo Bench Canal & 
Irrigation Company owned the laterals and had incorpora-· 
ted them into its system. (336-337). Any stockholder of 
the company who wanted his water delivered through the 
Southeast Ditch asked the secretary of the company to 
place it there for him, and the secretary was the only per-
son who could do it. (342). The amount of the- water de-
livered to each ditch was~ determined by the Provo Bench 
officers. (330-332). The list of stockholders receiving wa-
ter through the ditch or lateral was then submitted to the 
secretary of the ditch and the only organziation of users 
on the lateral was for the purpose of dividing the water 
furnished by the company into equal shares of time accor-
ding to the amount of stock certified to it by the secretary 
of the company. (118-119). All stockholders had not been 
notified of the time of their turn. (105). The superinten-
dent of the Provo Bench company testified as follows: 
"Well, I try and size up how much rainfall there is, and try 
and -determine, I mean in my own mind, how much water 
'tti.e people on Provo Bench need, and I regulate the flow of 
the canal accordingly." ( 359) . He did not advise anyone 
when he turned the water out of the canal. (361). 
The Southeast Ditch, a lateral of the Provo Bench 
Company, ended at the Christenson property and a ditch 
continued to the road, above the bridge, where the water 
washed into the respondent's canal. (124). About 11:00 
o'clock of the evening before the washout, water was flow-
ing across the road just above the bridge w'hich crossed the 
respondent's canal at 20th South and Main Streets, Orem. 
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It was enough that the witness stopped his car before cros-
sing. (8). It was still flowing about 6 o'clock the next mor-
ning. (262). Mr. Jensen testified: "Right at the bridge 
where this gravel had coursed from the road there was a 
big pile, there, practically blocked the canal, and we walked 
down the canal I should judge a hundred feet and kicked 
into the ne\V fill that had been carried down by the stream 
of water~ and it was approximately six inches deep at that 
point.'' (180). The road was washed out and practically 
impassable for from 20 to 25 rods and it took from 30 to 
60 cubic yards of fill to level the road. (21, 389) . There 
was no evidence of any rain water running down the street. 
(26). Mr. Schemensky, who had lived near there for 30 
years had never seen any run-off as the result of rain. 
(132). Before the washing out of the road it had been cov-
ered at the side by hay and trash, but after the washout 
the trash was no longer there. (184). 
The respondent's canal had been. cleaned· that spring 
for its entire length. ( 46) . About a half mile belo\v the 
bridge where the washing into the canal occurred a pipe 
in the canal was washed out. (39). Just above the intake 
_to this pipe was a screen to catch debris coming down the 
canal. The watermaster had checked it the night before 
and there was a little trash on it. The next morning it was 
filled right up. When the trash on the screen became hea-
vy, as on the morning of the washout, the trash would flow 
over. (243). See also plaintiff's Exhibit "F", a picture ta-
ken the day after the washout. Mr. Zobell, the secretary 
of the West Union, had also checked the screen the night 
before and it was then clear. (140). The pipe at the intake 
could run 35 second feet of water. (21~). On May 5, 1946, 
the canal had carried 41.2 second feet of water at the head 
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and there was about 25 second feet going to the pipe and 
it was taking it well there. (247-248). On the night in ques-
tion there was 30 second feet coming into the canal and be-
low the Davis corner there would be 18 second feet. (241). 
It is respondent's theory, and the court adopted it, that, 
where the canal had successfully carried and was able to 
carry more water than the West Union had in it at the 
time of the break, and water from the lateral of the Provo 
Bench had washed out a road, carrying down a large 
amount of dirt and gravel, together with trash, along the 
road, such trash and extra water were the causes of the 
break. 
To clear the canal below the break and to scrape a way 
for the new section of the canal took 70 hours with a bull-
dozer, at the reasonable price of $6.00 per hour. (188). The 
cost of the pipe which was washed out was $235.00, and 
had taken three men two days to put in. (172-173). The 
cleaning of the ditch at the bridge took two men and a team 
two days, and the reasonable cost of such work was from 
$10.00 to $12.00 for the man and team per day and $1.00 
per hour for the extra man. (181-183). To GOnstruct a new 
canal in the place available for such canal cost $1674.61. 
(203). The Court found a total damage of $699.25. 
Additional statements of fact will be ·adverted to in the 
argument. 
ARGUMENT 
The arguments in appellant's brief are grouped in four 
divisions, and respondent's brief will generally follow this 
division. 
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I. 
THE SOUTHEAST DITCH WAS A LATERAL 
OWNED BY AND UNDER TilE CONTRO~L OF APPEL-
LANT. 
Appellant objects to the finding that the Southeast 
Ditch was a ditch of respondent's. The evidence shows that 
the appellant owned this lateral and had incorporated it in-
to the company. (336). The only person who had authori-
ty to change water stock from one lateral to another was 
the secretary of respondent. (342). The amount of water 
delivered to each lateral was determined by the officers of 
respondent. (330-332). The list of stockholders whose wa-
ter was turned into the lateral was then submitted to the 
secretary of the lateral and his only authority was to di-
vide the time in accordance with the list. (118-119). The 
superintendent of appellant testified: "Well, I try and size 
up how much rainfall there is, and try to determine, I mean 
in my own mind, how much water the people on Provo 
Bench need, and I regulate the flow of the canal according-
ly." (359). He did not advise anyone when he turned the 
water out of the canal. (361). This evidence is practically 
uncontradicted, and would seem sufficient evidence upon 
which to base the finding. There is no evidence of anyone 
else being the owner of this Ia teral. 
Appellant argues that it has no duty to see that a way 
is provided to care for unused water. The recent case of 
Briant vs. Fremont Irrigation Co., 86 Pac. 2d 588,,_· __ 
Utah , at page 590 states: 
"(2, 3) Utah is one of the arid states and the con-
servation of water is of the utmost importance to· the 
public welfare. To waste water is to injure that wel-
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fare, and it is therefore the duty of the user of water 
to return the surplus or waste water into the stream 
from which it was taken so that further use can be 
made by others. See Kinney on Irrigation and Water 
Rights, 2d_ Ed., Sec. 812, pages 1614-1616. Further-
more, the natural channel serves as the natural drain-
age for the waters in the area. Appellant's allegation 
therefore that respondent returned and allowed others 
to return waste water to its natural channel, could not, 
in the absence of an allegation of negligence in the 
manner of so returning the water, entitle him to any 
redress against respondent for doing that which it 
should do." 
See also Salt River Valley Water ·Users' Assn. vs. Stew-
art, 34 Pac. 2d (Ariz.) 400; Billings Realty Co. vs. Big Ditch 
Co., 115 Pac. (Mont.) 828. 
A general demurrer was interposed to the amended 
complaint. In the complaint it is alleged that the .appellant 
failed to provide for excess and unused water, knowing 
that it was not cared for and a potential danger, and also 
that respondent failed to notify users of water of their 
turns and that these acts of negligence were causes of the 
damages alleged. 'V-Ie submit that these are acts of negli-
gence and certainly good against a general demurrer. 
All users on the night of the washout had not been 
notified that it was their turn to water. (105). The South-
east Ditch is continued to the road above the bridge where 
the water washed into respondent's canal. (124). During 
that night the periods for irrigation turns, as shown by 
plaintiff's Exhibit "G," varied from seven minutes to about 
three hours, with a total of 13 irrigators in less than 12 
hours and two of those had over half the time. The proba-
bility of an irrigator with seven minutes turn getting up 
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in the middle of the night in a rain to take a turn of that 
length is small. The appellant has furnished the water to 
these stockholders knowing these things, and now wants 
to put the loss on respondent, which could do nothing 
about it. It is submitted that, as the cases say, the appel-
lant did have an obligation to see that a way was provided 
for waste and unused water to get back to the natural 
channel or be safely taken care of in some other manner. 
Appellant is surely not contending that the respondent 
must maintain such a canal that it will take care of all 
the \Vater the appellant can tum into the road above its 
canal. 
It may be that the system was adequate when the 
users were large users with crops that required water each 
irrigation turn, but with turns for part shares, with small 
plots and short turns, it is not now adequate to control the 
water. We submit that this is the problem of appellant, and 
cannot be pushed on respondent. 
II. 
APPELLANT OWES A DUTY TO CARE FOR 
\VASTE OR .UNUSED WATER. 
Appellant objects to the finding of fact No. 4, in which 
it was found that the Southeast Ditch Company is an asso-
ciation of stockholders for the convenience of the Provo 
Bench Canal & Irrigation Company. The only evidence on 
this was that the only purpose of .the organization of the 
stockholders was to divide the time among the stockhold-
ers in accordance with the list of shares of stock submitted 
to them by the secretary of respondent. (118-119). From 
this it \vould seem to be only an organization to save the 
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secretary of respondent the job of figuring out the time 
for each turn. It had no part in the control of the lateral. 
There is no dispute in the evidence that all the stock-
holders had not received the notice of their turns. The 
list, plaintiff's Exhibit "G", was made up from the slips 
not delivered the day after the washout. (105). The water 
had been turned into the canal and laterals of appellant, 
and some water had probably been in the canal and later-
als- all winter. To turn down a full supply without seeing 
to it that the users were notified that the time for regular 
turns had begun is not the act of one who is careful. We 
believe that appellant was under duty to see that such no-
tice was given. They had been notified that there was dan-
ger at the exact point where the damage occurred. (59-60). 
To say that the company can put water in its own ditches 
without notifying the users that their turns have started, 
and without a place for the unused or excess water to go, 
does and should constitute negligence. 
Appellant argues that it would be impossible for it to 
control the water to the end of the laterals. Had it been 
distributed over the land of the stockholders near the end 
of the ditch there would have been no damage. If the com-
pany had someone who would care for the water and see 
that it did not go into this particular cii'tch unlss it could' 
be used, there would have been no damage. As between ap-
pellant and respondent, there would seem to be no question 
of whose liability it should be. 
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III. 
NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT PLEADED AND 
PROVED. 
Appel~ant argues that there is no allegation of negli-
gence or proof of negligence. As has been stated, the com-
plaint did allege the negligence of appellant in failing to 
care for the waste or unused water in the ditch. It \Vas al-
so alleged that appellant had failed to notify the stockhold-
ers of the times of their turns. The evidence heretofore 
referred to shows such to be the case. A general demur-
rer was interposed to the amended complaint, and in its 
construction respondent is entitled to all that it fairly al-
leges. If appellant wanted a n1ore detailed statement of 
in what way it had failed to provide for care of waste wat-
er, it should have been demanded by special demurrer. 
It is not contended that the appellant is an insurer, 
but with -notice of damage being done, and more probable, 
certainly an irrigation company cannot say it has no duty 
to see that unused or waste water in its ditch is so disposed 
that it does not _injure other parties. 
We submit that under the authorities cited above it 
is the duty of the appellant to see that such water is cared 
for. 
Appellant argues that there is no evidence that the 
stockholders did not use their water during the night in 
question. There can be no question but that water in quan-
tity flowed from the end of the ditch on the road and into 
the canal of respondent. From the very situation of the 
irrigation ditch, watering land on both sides (125) the ditch 
could not accumulate rain water. 
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There was enough water in the ditch and flowing out 
at the end of it to wash a road for a distance of 20 to 25 
rods, making it impassable. (21). It washed enough into 
the respondent's canal to block the canal where it went in, 
and at a hundred feet from that point was 6 inches deep. 
(180). Probably the amount of the water, in and of itself, 
would not have done the damage, but with the debris that 
was picked up along the way, the extra water did cause the 
damage complained of by the respondent. 
On May 5th the respondent's canal had carried 41.2 
second feet at the head and 25 second feet at the pipe. (247-
248) . On the night in question there was 30 second feet 
at the head and 18 second feet at the pipe. (241). The ca-
nal had been cleaned shortly before. ( 46) . The screen at 
the intake to the pipe had been checked the night before 
and found practically clean. The next morning it was filled 
right up. (243) . The intake to the pipe would take care 
of 35 second feet of water. (214) . HJow can appellant say 
there is no evidence that this extra water and debris was 
not responsible? It is much more reasonable, under such 
facts, to assume that the debris and extra water were the 
responsible agents. 
The pipe or flume washed out had been placed in an 
iron half pipe that had been there for several years, and 
the dirt under it had been pushed in by a bulldozer and 
tamped. ( 176) . 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" is a picture of the screen to 
catch the deb liS about 75 feet above the intake to this pipe. 
This picture was taken the day after the washout. ( 40). 
A glance at it will show that the water had raised the de· 
bris high enough to flow around the screen, and undoubt· 
edly this is what had happened and caused the break and 
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washout. With the amount of \Vater in the West Union 
Canal, less than had successfully been used previously, 
such a conclusion-that the debris caused the stoppage of 
the pipe-seems \Veil justified. 
There was no substantial amotmt of flood water on 
that night. Mr. Dawson, the president of the respondent 
company, testified that the wash from the State Road did 
not lead into the canal at that time (69) and that the wash 
from the State Rload later in the year was caused by irri-
gation water. (70). Mr. Schemensky, who had resided in 
that neighborhood for 30 years, testified that he had never 
seen surplus rain \Vater flowing down the road above the 
bridge where the washin occurred. (13). Mr. Gappmayer 
testified that there was no evidence of any washing above 
where the ditch came to the road, and that the ground 
would take a lot of water. (207). 
The trial court was able to see the witnesses when they 
testified, and to judge of their credibility, and. his findings 
have much evidence to support them. 
IV. 
NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT CAUSE OF DAM-
AGE TO RESPONDENT. 
Appellant contends that there is no evidence to con-
nect it with the damages to the canal of respondent. It 
has been set forth previously that the Southeast-Ditch was 
a ditch of appellant's, who did what supervising was done 
on it; that the water came out of this ditch and washed the 
rocks, dirt and debris from the road into respondent's ca-
nal; that this canal had previously handled more water 
than was in the canal on the night in question; that the 
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screen just above the intake to the pipe was clear the night 
before the washout and was covered over the next morning. 
The plaintiff's Exhibit "F" shows that the sticks and straw 
had been washed around this scren. This picture was ta-
ken the day after the washout. No one saw the water go 
over the screen and the debris sticking at the mouth of the 
pipe, ·but there is plenty of evidence on which to base such 
a conclusion. 
Appellant cites the evidence of Mr. Davis. He never 
went above the bridge and never said he looked to see if 
the canal had been washed full of rocks. He heard the 
rocks rolling down during the night and no one saw them 
below the bridge the next day. Mr. Ervil Davis stopped 
his car at about 11 o'clock the night before, because the 
water was washing across the road about 40 feet above 
the bridge. (8). 
Appellant claims the West ·Up.ion Canal had broken 
its banks at other times when it was raining. The time re-
ferred to was caused by water from Roy Gappmayer's farm, 
which put a bar of gravel in the ditch. (175). 
Mr. Frank Wentz testified that the water from the ri-
ver at the intake to the canal could nof change much. (387). 
The official records show 30 second feet at the intake. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "I'', page 77). Appellant's Southeast 
Ditch circled the hill above where the respondent's canal 
is located, and the Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Com-
pany did not report any other wash into respondent's ca-
nal. (103-104). 
This is a case where the trial judge determines the 
fact, and if there is evidence to sustain his judgment, this 
Court will not reverse it. We submit that there is not only 
sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, but that the 
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clear preponderance of the evidence sustains it. There is 
no other reasonable conclusion that can be reached on the 
evidence submitted. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the ap-
pellant has not sustained the burden of showing that no 
substantial evidence was introduced upon which the find-
ings could be based. In fact, it was by picking out only un-
usually favorable pieces of evidence that the matter could 
be presented favorably to its contention. 
We believe that an irrigation company has some duty 
other than merely bringing the water for irrigation out of 
a river and then turning it loose without notice, and with-
out a sufficient ditGh to care for it. We believe that this is 
especially true where they have been notified that damages 
have resulted before and indications are that further dam-
age would be caused by them. 
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs to re-
spondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J.C.HALBERSLEBEN, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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